The Cruciality of Disarmament in Dialogue with Bandits By Samuel Aruwan
In a remote village situated within Katsina State, desperate community leaders convened a meeting with notorious bandit kingpins to negotiate for a lasting peace. The bandits arrived for the talks openly brandishing their automatic rifles—a vivid and powerful symbol of a fundamental flaw inherent in the prevailing approach to ending a security crisis that has persistently defied multiple attempted solutions: specifically, the belief that dialogue can genuinely succeed without first ensuring comprehensive disarmament. This very scene, repeatedly enacted across Nigeria’s northwest for many years, lies directly at the heart of a fierce and ongoing national debate that polarizes opinion between those who see dialogue as the ultimate necessary solution and those who view the bandits simply as criminals who must be decisively crushed by kinetic force.
One prominent school of thought, which firmly supports the dialogue option, passionately believes the bandits originally took up arms primarily in response to profound injustices and indiscriminate killings perpetrated against their kith and kin by local volunteers popularly referred to as ‘Yan Sakai in virtually all the flashpoint areas. Another argument frequently put forward by some of those supporting this dialogue pathway is that bandits who are willing to dialogue cannot easily or safely surrender their arms due to a legitimate fear of being targeted and eliminated by rival bandit factions opposed to dialogue; hence, they argue, disarmament should logically be a gradual and managed process. Conversely, those staunchly opposed to any form of dialogue stand firmly on the principled grounds that these bandits are essentially criminals engaged in heinous killings and kidnapping purely for economic purposes, thereby severely undermining national security, and consequently must be dealt with strictly in accordance with the full force of the law. They also argue, with considerable force, that many specific attacks, which lead directly to tragic killings and kidnappings, cannot be plausibly linked to the historical injustices often cited by some apostles of dialogue.
A sophisticated fourth perspective opines that a hybrid approach, incorporating both kinetic and non-kinetic measures, is necessary but must be intelligently modified to accurately reflect the realistic situation on the ground. For this pragmatic group, any potential dialogue must be conducted unequivocally from a position of demonstrated strength, not perceived weakness. They argue with strategic conviction that bandits must first be fought headlong and militarily decimated to a critical point where the weakened remnants will have no choice but to sincerely ask for dialogue, as opposed to the routine and cynical practice where bandits, sensing they are temporarily losing the upper hand, tactically use the back door of dialogue to restock their arsenal before reverting to their criminal trade.
Caught tragically in the middle of this complex conflict is the large and suffering population of victims—profoundly vulnerable and fragile, having suffered an unprecedented loss of human lives and livelihood. This grievously includes innocent herder communities who disproportionately bear the brunt due solely to their tribal affinity with the bandits, a critical point I will further highlight and expand upon later. But for now, follow me closely as I revisit in meticulous detail the significant events that transpired as the nation watched with bated breath from Katsina State, where the local community and the bandit kingpins directly interfaced.
On Sunday, 14th September 2025, a highly significant peace dialogue was convened in Hayin Gada, located in the Faskari Local Government Area of Katsina State. The community leadership hosted a substantial group of high-profile bandit leaders in a determined bid to broker a sustainable peace in view of the relentless killings, kidnappings, and other menaces directly associated with banditry. The bandit groups that came forward for this high-stakes mediation boasted some of the staunchest and most notorious armed bandits operating in North-Western Nigeria. Present was a particularly hardened bandit leader identified as Kachalla Isiya Kwashen-Garwa, who stood authoritatively for the non-state actors and reeled out their detailed grievances and primary reasons for their violent actions. Serving as a key oracle guiding the delicate talks and assuring the community of peace was the infamous Ado Aleru, a figure widely reported in the media for his mediating role.
Another formidable kingpin seated prominently at the parley was Mustapha Babaro, who had personally unleashed a relentless wave of terror on the Kankara and Malumfashi areas. This specific Babaro was credibly believed to have spearheaded a recent brutal attack during pre-dawn prayers at a mosque in Mantau village, Malumfashi LGA, where thirty-two innocent worshippers were tragically killed and many others severely injured—constituting one of the most recent violent episodes widely reported by the press. Babaro appeared at this critical dialogue sporting a military camouflage jungle hat and confidently brandishing an automatic rifle. He and his numerous armed fighters converged under the overarching leadership of Kachalla Isiya Kwashen-Garwa, a figure who had personally carried out countless kidnappings, massive rustling operations, and deadly attacks across Faskari, Kankara, Funtua, Bakori, and other parts of Katsina State. Kwashen-Garwa was also wearing a distinctive military jungle hat and was slinging a rifle menacingly. About ten loaded AK-47 magazines adorned his torso, giving him a distinctly fearsome combatant look. His surprisingly calm and confident demeanor belied the stark fact that back in 2022, he was officially declared wanted by the authorities, with a substantial bounty of no less than five million naira placed on his head. Now, he was present here at this meeting with scores of his loyal followers, all bearing an array of assorted and sophisticated arms. It painted a curious and paradoxical picture of a peace agenda supposedly in the offing.
Beyond the stark array of notorious personalities present—alongside local leaders, concerned individuals, and other stakeholders—the specific tone and content of the conversation at this pivotal peace meeting also called for close attention. The bandit leaders expressed some interesting and revealing positions, not least those put forward authoritatively by Kwashen-Garwa. Delivered with the gravitas of a sermon, and quoting the Holy Book in some critical instances, his speech highlighted the alleged targeted killing of Fulani by volunteers (Yan Sakai) and some security forces, describing it graphically as indiscriminate profiling and killing of members of his tribe, which he claimed directly led to their violent defensive reactions.
In a rousing wave of persuasive rhetoric, Kwashen-Garwa described the collective experience of Fulani in Nigeria as a lifelong story of blatant stereotyping, systemic injustice, and profound suffering under insincere leadership and widespread hypocrisy. He claimed passionately that every negative action committed by a Fulani individual is thrust aggressively into the limelight, while crimes clearly linked to persons of Hausa extraction are tactfully and conveniently ignored by the authorities and media. He wondered rhetorically if criminals were only to be found among the Fulani and not among other tribes, declaring the political leaders insincere and the general followers equally dishonest.
Kwashen-Garwa reminded all present how the world had been rightly shocked by the news of the pre-dawn attack on the mosque in Malumfashi, but how few knew that before this specific attack, in Kadisau village of Faskari LGA, five Fulani individuals were cruelly slaughtered on a certain Friday. He lamented poignantly that this earlier tragedy had never made significant news. Those victims, he stated emotionally, were buried quietly in Kampanin Daudawa. He went on to surmise strategically that the Malumfashi attack was a direct consequence, not an isolated incident; the victims were only reaping what had been sown in the attack against Fulani in Kadisau. Kwashen-Garwa attempted to give the religious backing of a dictum of “kill and be killed in return.” After all, he intoned solemnly, no single life should be considered more valuable than the next. How can they continue to kill Fulani and still expect to live in peace? He declared that unjustly harming a believer was akin to destroying the sanctity of the Ka’aba, and then stated unequivocally that since every soul must taste death, his men would not hesitate to dispense it generously in retaliation for the deaths of their kin.
Ado Aleru’s comments took on a slightly more positive and conciliatory tone. He expressed genuine optimism that the current peace deal would yield positive results in Katsina State and even potentially beyond its borders. He contrasted this hope with his participation in previous peace deals, observing pointedly that an earlier effort fell apart decisively after his son was unjustly arrested. The perceived unwillingness of important actors to intervene at that time led him to publicly denounce the peace process and resume hostility. After issuing this thinly veiled caveat, Aleru expressed renewed confidence that the current process would prove more effective and durable.
Parts of the agreement reached at the dialogue, as I gathered from reliable sources, stipulated firmly that the bandits led by Kwashen-Garwa would cease all attacks and kidnappings and free all citizens held in captivity, even beyond the immediate Faskari area. In return, the villages in Faskari are to ensure and facilitate the release of Kwashen-Garwa’s men who are being held. An official of the Katsina State Government was later heard on a foreign radio station confirming the broad agreement and adding significantly that the bandits had also tabled specific requests for hospitals, schools, and substantial support for animal husbandry.
I quite agree objectively that some herders and Fulani communities have indeed been victims of the excesses of aggrieved parties who suffered terrible losses at the hands of bandits. This vicious cycle of targeting further deepens and dangerously complicates banditry and farmer-herder conflicts, taking on potent ethnic and religious dimensions, and makes genuine peace profoundly difficult to achieve, often becoming a cynical tool for political mobilization. My substantive stint as Spokesperson for the Governor and Government of Kaduna State, being an active member of the State Security Council and later as the Commissioner of Internal Security and Home Affairs, exposed me directly to this complex reality and many more intricate issues, which I have discussed extensively in understanding the challenges of managing banditry in Northern Nigeria.
Reverting to the immediate issue at hand, amidst the deep skepticism over the acceptance of the peace deal on the bandits’ side, the recent parley at Faskari has reignited a vigorous debate on the fundamental efficacy of dialogue with bandits. Observers have raised serious concerns over the ability of some bandits to still move freely with their arms without surrendering them to the authorities as a basic sign of genuine repentance. The Katsina State Government, however, has publicly said there has been a remarkable 70 percent reduction in banditry, kidnapping, and cattle rustling across the state, following the implementation of a comprehensive community policing strategy and sustained offensive operations against criminal elements.
The State Commissioner for Internal Security and Home Affairs, Dr. Nasir Mu’azu, speaking during a high-stakes consultation on security and governance organized by Governor Dikko Umaru Radda to brief indigenes on security progress, stated authoritatively that the well-designed community policing approach, coupled with intermittent offensive operations against bandits and their enclaves, has forced many criminal groups to reach out to community leaders seeking peace accords. He listed notable bandit kingpins who have indicated a willingness to lay down arms, including Audu Lankai and others from Jibia Local Government Area; Abu Radde and associates from Batsari; Ruga Kachalla and his group from Safana LGA; Ummaru Manore and others from Danmusa LGA; Sani Muhidingi and associates from Kurfi LGA; and Wada and his group from Musawa LGA.
The commissioner revealed strategically that community leaders are currently working intensively to secure similar peace accords in Sabuwa, Faskari, and Kankara. He confirmed the State Government’s full knowledge of the peace accords and dialogues with notable bandit kingpins like Kwashen Garwa, Ado Aleru, Mustapha Babaro, and Risku in the three councils mentioned.
Renowned cleric Sheikh Ahmad Abubakar Gumi commented significantly on the Faskari parley, expressing positive feelings about the dialogue on his social media page. Sheikh Gumi, however, insinuated carefully that some persons would still end up provoking the bandits by attacking them and urged strongly that such persons not give in to their desire for vengeance. This gives another unsteady posture to the delicate deal. Gumi opined with caution: “Some people who don’t want peace will provoke them again by attacking them. It’s very important to educate them that they are being used by those capitalizing on their ignorance and zeal for vengeance.”
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In his detailed argument, a retired senior military officer, Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu, stated categorically that the Federal and State governments should not involve the military directly in negotiation with bandits, saying, “I would hate to see a picture of any military man sitting side by side with an armed, defiantly bandoliered bandit at a negotiation meeting. But if care is not taken, that’s where we are heading. For avoidance of doubt and for several reasons, the military should not be involved in negotiation with bandits.”
He further argued persuasively that it breeds a dangerous erosion of professionalism, illegitimately legitimizes criminality, and undermines civil authority, adding that involving the military may create a perilous scenario where bandits view direct talks with the armed forces as proof that violence “works,” potentially increasing cycles of abduction, extortion, and attacks. He summed it up decisively by stating that even if civilian-led negotiations are to be pursued, amnesty should not be blanket, and any engagement should be tightly tied to a comprehensive accountability framework: ensuring justice for perpetrators of serious crimes, amnesty/reintegration only for low-level actors, and clear sequencing with ongoing security operations.
On Wednesday, 17th September 2025, after the initial Hayin Gada dialogue, Kwashen-Garwa, aiming to prove his sincerity to the agreement, released 30 captives kidnapped in the same Faskari Local Government Area without any payment of ransom. Garwa handed over the captives to the leadership of the Faskari Local Government, led by the Secretary, Bashir Umar Maigora, who confirmed that both sides had mutually agreed to releasing those in captivity and detention during the previous dialogue. Kwashen Garwa, in his remarks during the handover, said they had started fulfilling their own side of the bargain and were looking forward expectantly to the other side doing the same.
On Friday, 19th September 2025, Kwashen-Garwa, acting on instructions from his superior according to a viral video statement, said he went around the forests and secured the release of more captives. The total number of freed persons now stood at 72, in accordance with the terms of the dialogue agreement. “You have seen that these people were released because of the promises we made during the peace pact meeting. You can see them—there are 40 of them,” he said. “Two people were released earlier and are not part of this group of 40. On Wednesday we released 30 people. Altogether, they number 72.”
However, he expressed deep disappointment over an attack on some herders in Ruwan Godiya village, which he declared a serious breach of the agreement. He reported that men, women, and children were killed, and their motorcycles and other properties were seized. “I was instructed to go into the bush to ensure all kidnapped victims were released, and I am still trying to gather everyone who was kidnapped,” he stated. “While I was going around to secure their release, I received a report from Ruwan-Godiya that security operatives went to meet our people and shot them. It was not only our people—Hausa people were affected too. They killed men, women and children, and they also took our property, including motorcycles. This situation suggests that some people among the security operatives do not want us to live in peace. If you will act, take decisive action on this matter. If you do not, we will return to our previous fighting, and if things worsen you will tell the world that we violated the promises we made.”
Whatever one may make of these complex developments, only time will tell the ultimate sincerity of Kwashen-Garwa and his foot-soldiers. From this writer’s analytical standpoint, this peace effort appears largely community-driven, and the locals stand to benefit greatly if the ceasefire endures, as it will enable them to move freely, return safely to their farms, and resume other critical economic activities as part of their essential recovery.
In order to place the recent happenings in Faskari in their proper context, it is necessary to provide a comprehensive overview of banditry. While banditry and cattle rustling in the Northwest have been intimately linked and go as far back as the early 1960s, the origin of contemporary banditry in Northern Nigeria is multifaceted, with its modern iteration evolving decisively from farmer-herder clashes in Zamfara State around 2011. As Murtala Ahmed Rufai discussed in his “I am a Bandit”, the killing of a Fulani leader Alhaji Ishe by the typically overzealous “Yan Sakai” marked a critical turning point, generating ethnically tinted reprisals and counterattacks which eventually engulfed Zamfara and beyond. Beyond this specific history, and from my continuous research, I have identified a complex web of factors responsible for the entrenchment of banditry. This crisis is not monolithic; it is fueled by a toxic combination of systemic failures and deep-seated societal issues and has created further security challenges linked intricately with ethnicity, religion, and even politics.
These range from the government’s persistent insensitivity to early warnings and the damaging misrepresentations and biases in media coverage, to a near-total lack of recourse to law by aggrieved parties. The problem is further exacerbated by the politicization of security, where ethnicity and religion are cynically infused into security problems, preventing a unified national response. This is all set against a backdrop of extreme poverty, pervasive illiteracy—both Western and religious—and a crippling lack of basic social amenities, which creates a fertile recruiting ground for criminality.
The operational environment for bandits is facilitated by preponderant ungoverned spaces and porous border management, which allow for the rampant proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This is compounded by an inadequate security footprint on the ground and a weak justice system, often undermined by the complicity of some local leaders and security personnel. The prevalence of informants who aid these criminals completes a vicious cycle that is incredibly difficult to break. Most alarmingly, we are now witnessing a dangerous intersection between bandits and terrorist groups, creating a hybrid threat that is even more formidable.
Furthermore, banditry does not exist in a vacuum; it survives on a sophisticated and resilient economic base, a financial circulatory system powered by multiple illicit revenue streams. This includes the obvious ransoms from kidnapped persons and the profits from sales of rustled cattle, but it extends far deeper into the criminal underworld. Bandits generate significant income through gunrunning, the arms trade, and even leasing their weapons to other armed groups, alongside trafficking in illicit drugs. They engage in joint kidnapping operations with other criminal outfits and impose protection levies on terrified farming communities. Funds also allegedly flow from politically motivated sources, while some bandits launder their proceeds through apparently legitimate businesses like commercial motorcycles or farming, operated by proxies and local collaborators. They conduct specialized mercenary operations, extort protection money from illegal miners, and are often directly involved in illegal mining activities themselves.
The consequences of this intricate and self-sustaining criminal system are devastatingly multi-dimensional. It poses an existential threat to national food security and livestock farming, cripples education and healthcare delivery, and shreds the very fabric of social cohesion. The rural economy is utterly shattered, which in turn stifles broader economic development and scares away investments, leading to a high rural-urban drift and entrenched extreme poverty. This pervasive criminality takes away scarce resources meant for development to address lingering security concerns, it threatens social cohesion and provides a ready supply of recruits and resources for terrorist networks. Ultimately, the continued existence of this bandit economy is not just a law-and-order issue; it is a clear and present threat to national security that must be contained.
While those concerned with statutory responsibilities continue to fashion a way out of this conundrum, it must be fundamentally understood that banditry exists on a substratum which is a rich and complex economy. A major component of that system is the pervasive presence and flow of arms. The presence of arms sustains a persistent propensity for an easy return to a life of crime, especially for individuals who are used to the powerful allure of quick and illegal money. Dialogue is not wrong in and of itself, but it must be done in a standard sequence. This sequence is justifiably recognized by the United Nations and global experts. It is a sequence that places Disarmament first.
Disarmament—the collection, control, and disposal of weapons from combatants—must come logically before any form of demobilization, which is the controlled disbandment of armed groups and breaking down of their command structures. If demobilization, like we saw symbolically in Faskari, is to be genuine and durable, disarmament should unequivocally precede it. Tellingly, we saw the bandit leaders proudly displaying their arms at the very seat of peace discussions. In a more personal reaction to the recent Faskari peace process, the retired military officer, Group Captain Shehu, opined that baseless and direct negotiations with bandits carry the significant risk of legitimizing criminality and eroding military professionalism or “defanging” the military. He noted authoritatively that the right sequence should be followed meticulously, and importantly, these activities should be civilian driven.
With the increasing prominence of dialogue as a means to ending this violent conflict, the place of justice and recourse to the law must not be downplayed. It is true that some of the justifications for violence advanced by bandit leaders like Kwashe Garwa are valid. However, it is clear they are being overplayed and used strategically to gaslight or guilt-trip the public. Nevertheless, the government and security agencies must ensure that the justice system is strengthened enough to root out the weaponization of stereotypes. There must be stiff punishment for taking lives on the basis of ethnicity alone; but there must also be a clear extension of justice against bandits who kill and abduct citizens wantonly. Virtually all bandit leaders – from Alhaji Kundu to Buderi Isiya, Buharin Yadi, Buharin Daji, Ali Kachalla, and others too numerous to mention – have used the excuse of stereotypes and targeted attacks on their kinsmen to continue their violent atrocities. Marginalization, bias, or stereotyping, no matter how well presented, can no longer be presented at the dialogue table as an excuse for killing and plundering. The public is not blind to the astounding gains that these bandit leaders have accumulated in cash, cattle, and assets at the expense of the blood and lives of innocent citizens. They cannot claim to be perpetrating heinous crimes on behalf of their weakened kith and kin while they are simultaneously acquiring vast wealth for their personal aggrandizement.
The Faskari dialogue may have presented a fleeting opportunity for some respite from the relentless scourge of banditry. Its full effectiveness over an extended period remains to be seen. What is paramount is that the Government of Katsina – and indeed other affected states – must develop a defined strategy for proper profiling and classification of bandits to create a more systematic and sustainable approach to dialogue, but disarmament remains the ultimate prerequisite. Peace can only follow certain trusted systems and established formulae.
The Faskari parley offered a glimpse of hope, but also a profoundly troubling image: menacing figures in jungle hats and rifles negotiating peace on their own terms. Peace without prior disarmament is at best a temporary pause with guns still at the ready. Enduring stability will come only when dialogue is backed by following the basic protocols, disarmament, and the courage to dismantle the criminal economies that sustain violence.
Disarmament remains critically important, going by the submission of Dr Rufai in his thesis, detailing how these armed groups have over time generated huge capital from many outlets and spend handsomely on arms procurement and intelligence gathering. Some members within the groups were notoriously associated with weapon supplies. He further explained how these groups used their international connections, especially in the Sahel, to acquire arms which were ferried across the ever-increasing porous borders in the North-West. He explained how middlemen and retailers of arms across forests have emerged, and the arms business is an industry of its own in the forests and camps. He corroborated my earlier submissions of bandits trading in gunrunning, saying there are bandits who do not go on operations, but only remain in the camps to rent out guns and sell ammunition to others, making more money than those going out for attacks. His submission also noted incapacitated bandit leaders who retire and become gunrunners or renters.
As a researcher of this pervasive menace, one is fully conscious of how it is a byproduct of an accumulation of deep-seated problems that were left unattended or unaddressed over a long time, growing into a monster that now threatens national security. The nation has been struggling valiantly to overcome it. Until we address these root causes with courage and implement dialogue through the proven sequence of disarmament first, we as a people and a nation remain trapped in a fragile calm, perpetually haunted by the shadows of terror.
Aruwan is a postgraduate student of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. [email protected]
