From Sambisa to Kainji: How B’Haram, Bandits, JNIM are driving a cross-regional terror alliance in Nigeria
By Zagazola Makama
Emerging security assessments identifying specific commanders, bomb-makers and facilitators point to a deepening, evidence-based pattern in which Boko Haram’s Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), organised bandit groups and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) elements are increasingly functioning as a loose but lethal coalition across Nigeria’s North-East, North-West and North-Central zones. Please
At the core of the emerging threat is a JAS suicide-bombing network traced to the Ali Ngulde camp, with technical direction allegedly provided by veteran IED expert Munzir Abu Ziyadah. Intelligence indicates that Abu Ziyadah’s team prepared up to 10 person-borne IED (PBIED) attacks, routed through the Ngoshe Mountains, transiting Gazuwa and Ngom, before infiltrating towns across Borno State.
The Dec. 24 suicide bombing at Gamboru Market mosque in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) is assessed by Zagazola Makama as one execution point within this wider plan, rather than a stand-alone operation. Subsequent intelligence specifically flagged Gwoza and Pulka, particularly on market days, as prospective targets, with reports confirming that one female Boko Haram member was embedded among the PBIED elements an operational detail consistent with past JAS tactics in soft targets.
Deep sources further sheds light on JAS’ internal Militant structure. Before his reported death, Ustaz, the Amir al-Jaish in Barwa, served as the de facto number two to Bakura Doro, overseeing the security of JAS’ headquarters. Alongside him, JAS maintained a decentralized command arrangement under three principal terrorist leaders : Ali Ngulde (Mandara Mountains axis), Sadikku (North-West and North-Central axis), and Ustaz (Barwa).
Recent clashes point to how rivalry within jihadist factions can intensify violence. Following a surprise JAS attack on ISWAP positions around the Lake Chad islands, ISWAP reportedly retaliated by killing Ustaz, signalling that internecine conflict remains a driver of high-impact attacks as factions seek to reassert dominance.
While the North-East continues to face the classic Boko Haram suicide threat, developments in the North-West reveal a dangerous mutation. Intelligence linking bandit kingpins to former Sambisa-based IED experts marks a significant escalation in the character of violence in Zamfara and neighbouring states.
Sources names Alhaji Beti, identified as the younger brother of slain JAS/Ansaru leader Alhaji Bello, as a central facilitator of terror-bandit collaboration. Bello was killed in Rijana Forest, Kaduna State, in 2024, but his network appears to have survived.
According to the sources, Alhaji Beti is hosting Sambisa-linked IED experts inside Gando Forest, Zamfara State. These specialists are reportedly fabricating IEDs intended for deployment along critical access routes in Bukkuyum Local Government Area, with spillover risk into Sokoto and Kebbi States. The fabrication of roadside and vehicle-borne IEDs for deployment along major supply routes in Bukkuyum, parts of Sokoto and Kebbi represents a strategic shift aimed at disrupting movement, strangling commerce and stretching military response capacity.
Read Also:
As of Dec. 25, intelligence and community confirmations indicated that about 25 IED couriers had laid road-side IED (RSBIED) lanes along the Kyarum–Kairu MSR in Bukkuyum.
This evolution manifested starkly on Dec. 27 along the Dansadau–Gusau corridor, where coordinated IED detonations against a civilian convoy, followed by an attempted ambush on military elements, killed eight civilians.
The attack bore hallmarks of jihadist doctrine: layered explosives, exploitation of panic, and a follow-on armed engagement. Zagazola describe it as a clear departure from traditional bandit hit-and-run tactics. It pointed to how banditry is evolving beyond ransom-driven crime into terror-style warfare.
This intelligence also aligns with the Dec. 27 incident near Mai-Ayaya Village, Magami District, Gusau LGA, where multiple IEDs struck a civilian convoy escorted by troops, killing eight civilians. The follow-on ambush against an Army tanker reflects tactics commonly associated with jihadist groups rather than traditional banditry, lending weight to assessments that Boko Haram expertise is being exported into the North-West theatre.
Baba Adamu, also known as Kachallah Sadikku, was actively training the Dogo Gide-led group in IED construction to escalate attacks in the North-Central zone. This training pipeline coincides with reported collaboration between JNIM, Ansaru and JAS elements.
A case in point was the Dec. 22 attack on an NSCDC checkpoint at Ibrahim Leteh Village, along the Wawa–Luma MSR in Borgu LGA, Niger State. The attackers suspected JNIM fighters operating with Ansaru/JAS elements escaped through the Kainji National Park axis after seizing a rifle. The outpost’s proximity about 3 km to Wawa town and 9 km to the 221 Armoured Brigade barracks illustrate the strategic intent behind the assault.
Zagazola Makama identify Kainji National Park as a critical sanctuary, repeatedly referenced as a rear base for insurgents operating across the Niger–Kwara corridor. Communities such as Nuku, Durumma, Woro, Wawa and Babanna have formed a ring of recent attack sites around the park, reinforcing concerns that jihadist groups are methodically making preparation for more ambitious operations. The most recent attacks coordinated by Boko Haram terror networks was the abduction of 130 students from the St. Mary’s Catholic School, Papiri in November 24 and 26, 2025.
Taken together, the intelligence paints a picture of a multi-zonal, adaptive and increasingly lethal threat. The convergence of JAS suicide expertise, bandit mobility networks and JNIM operational doctrine represents a qualitative escalation that blurs the line between insurgency and organised crime.
This convergence reflects a deliberate strategy: JAS supplies suicide bombing and IED know-how; bandit leaders provide terrain access and logistics; JNIM contributes regional connectivity and combat experience. The result is a hybrid threat capable of mass-casualty attacks on highways, markets and places of worship.
For Nigeria’s security architecture, the implications are profound. The prioritisation of EOD-led route clearance on vulnerable MSRs, intensified surveillance of forest sanctuaries, and proactive intelligence fusion across theatres are no longer optional, they are strategic imperatives. Equally critical is sustained community engagement, without which early warning and HUMINT pipelines will remain fragile.
Zagazola Makama therefore calls for the need for anticipatory action rather than reactive deployments. As extremist actors seek to widen their operational depth and geographic reach, the cost of delayed or fragmented responses will be measured not only in disrupted trade and insecurity, but in civilian lives.
Zagazola Makama is a Counter Insurgency Expert and Security Analyst in the Lake Chad region.
