REVEALED: The AES shadow game fueling anti-ECOWAS, anti-Western disinformation across West Africa
A covert digital propaganda campaign led by the military regimes of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, under the auspices of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), is reshaping public opinion across West Africa, targeting ECOWAS and Western influence while legitimising military rule as a viable governance model.
This investigation reveals a highly coordinated digital cold war using bots, censorship, encrypted channels, and state media arms to export a pro-military and anti-democracy narrative through platforms like X (formerly Twitter), Telegram, and YouTube.
It involves over 1,500 unique accounts amplifying identical content across these platforms, generating a minimum of 3.7 million confirmed views within a month. The campaign is backed by junta-led media censorship and the rebranding of of “???????????????????????????????? d’????????????????????????????” to “AES Alert” between May 2024 and June 2025. African Stream also played a prominent role in pushing pro-Russian narratives that legitimise military rule and reject Western influence.
The regime’s grip has become so strategic that foundations have already been laid for an AES-branded Web TV, replacing conventional ECOWAS-facing narratives with pan-African, anti-imperialist, and pro-junta rhetoric.
Not by Accident – The Making of AES
The trend is not accidental as it emerged during a series of regional military takeovers that began with Mali in 2021, followed by Burkina Faso in 2022.
Then, on July 26, 2023, a flurry of encrypted WhatsApp messages began circulating among Sahelian military circles, West African journalists, and digital networks on the continent and worldwide.
According to unofficial discourse, the messages were cryptic, heavy with undertone but light on detail—until, just past midnight, the floodgates opened:
“Soldiers have taken over the presidential palace in Niamey.”
“Tchiani is now in control.”
In that moment, Niger became the third domino to fall in a regional cascade of military takeovers. The world watched in stunned silence as General Abdourahamane Tchiani, carrying the charisma of a reluctant saviour, declared the ousting of President Mohamed Bazoum and announced himself leader on July 28, 2023, in a final act of a trilogy that had been months—perhaps years—in the making.
The coordinated messaging wasn’t just hearsay. Independent researchers, including Mirjam de Bruijn of Leiden University, the Netherlands, confirmed that social media platforms—especially WhatsApp and X—played a central role in relaying accurate, real-time details during the coup’s opening hours.
Within days of Tchiani’s overthrow, the military regimes in Bamako and Ouagadougou had issued joint statements of solidarity, followed by official visits. Then came the rallies: in Niamey’s dusty city centre, thousands poured into the streets waving Russian flags and chanting anti-French slogans. In Mali, a protest was held in Bamako on December 13, 2024, demanding reparations from France and concluding with the symbolic burning of an effigy of President Macron. Organisers cited France’s colonial legacy and the economic harms it has caused over the decades.
Until the recent power grab by the Tchiani-led group, Niger not only stood out as the “last bastion of democracy in the Sahel,” but was moreover considered the “last bulwark against jihadis and Russian influence” across the region. Amid continuously deteriorating relationships with the Malian and Burkinabe ruling military juntas, Mohamed Bazoum’s democratically elected government emerged as a “new privileged partner” for Western allies.
That hope was, however, short-lived following the July 2023 coup. Tensions quickly escalated between Niger’s new military regime and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which ordered the deployment of troops to restore Niger’s flailing democracy but later backtracked.
For each junta intervention in the region, ECOWAS reacted with swift condemnation, denouncing the unconstitutional government changes and suspending all three countries from the regional bloc. Each time, ECOWAS imposed targeted sanctions—ranging from border closures and asset freezes to travel bans—and demanded immediate restoration of civilian rule through transitional timelines.
Frustrated by ECOWAS sanctions and perceived Western interference, the three coup leaders withdrew from the regional bloc. They formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) as a mutual defence pact in September 2023. This bloc later evolved into a confederation with economic integration and sovereignty ambitions in July 2024.
The Architects of AES Influence Campaigns
On December 10, 2023, in response to the ongoing 64th ECOWAS summit at the time, X account Sy Marcus Herve Traore (@marcus_herve) raised the alarm that ECOWAS had “refused” to recognise the transitional government of Niger. Sharing an accompanying three-second clip in a lengthy X post, he asserted that the man representing Niger at the 64th ECOWAS summit was its former Prime Minister, Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou. He then went on to make anti-Western remarks in the same post, suggesting that ousted democratic leaders should be kept remanded.
“Alright, folks, 4 months after the French and Western puppet Mohamed Bazoum has been ousted, ECOWAS still doesn’t recognise the new military leadership in Niger ????????. What do you make of all this?” he concludes.
In response, another X account, Vanessa Brown-Ajise (@VanessaAjise), tweeted, “The AES doesn’t need Ecowas’ recognition. Trust me, the West & their Puppets’re afraid of the #AllianceofSahelStates because they know #UnitedStatesOfAfrica will bankrupt the West.
The Spirits of great leaders like #Gaddafi, assassinated by the West, are rooting for the #AES (sic).”
Rhetorics like this usually act as catalysts or endgames to the AES sprawling media campaigns.
The influence campaign’s primary actors form a complex network of state and non-state entities across various media channels. At its core are the AES juntas, led by Goïta, Traoré, and Tchiani. These military leaders wield direct control over national media and public discourse, using their authority to shape narratives:
The Junta-led actors
State institutions, such as Mali’s Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision du Mali (ORTM) and Burkina Faso’s Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina (RTB), serve as mouthpieces, broadcasting pro-AES propaganda.
While ORTM is officially public, its editorial independence has been repeatedly compromised under the military junta. For example, in March 2022, the military authorities suspended broadcasts from France 24 and RFI via ORTM, accusing them of “false reporting” on Malian army killings. In November 2024, the Malian junta cut the signal of the popular news broadcaster Joliba TV News after a prominent politician criticised the military rulers of neighbouring Burkina Faso during a televised debate.
Jeune Afrique reported in December 2024 that the directors general of public media outlets in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso laid the foundations in Ouagadougou for a jointly coordinated AES-branded Web TV for the three countries. ORTM’s director reinforced coverage aligned with AES messaging to amplify junta viewpoints.
A June 2025 investigative analysis by State Media Monitor—The World’s State and Public Media Database – reveals that Burkina Faso’s Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina (RTB)’s news coverage is heavily dominated by pro-government messaging, reflecting direct government influence.
A 2024 independent content analysis by the State Media Monitor, which is also a project of the Media and Journalism Research Centre (MJRC), revealed that more than 80% of RTB’s political coverage favoured the government’s narrative, with opposition voices and critical commentary largely absent or marginal. Several documented cases in late 2023 and early 2024 exposed direct interventions by security agencies and the Ministry of Communication to block or alter critical reports, particularly those related to military operations and governance challenges during the country’s transitional period.
Beyond the Junta
Beyond the military administrations, foreign actors play a pivotal role. Russia, through its Wagner Group (now known as Africa Corps) and state media like Russia Today (RT), is a key partner. Russian military trainers and equipment have bolstered AES regimes since 2022, while RT’s French-language outlets amplify anti-Western sentiment. Reports suggest Russian media operations, including bots and AI-generated content, target Francophone Africa to sow distrust in Western institutions. An August 12, 2023, report by Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) confirms that Russian media outlets such as RT and Sputnik promote Russia as a “non-colonising ally” in Francophone Africa, amplifying anti-French narratives. RT’s French-language content contrasts Russia with Western powers, exploiting anti-colonial sentiment to undermine France and ECOWAS.
A 2024 Brookings analysis cited in the original context confirms Russian bot networks amplifying AES hashtags like #SouverainetéSahel, suggesting automated or coordinated online campaigns. This aligns with Wagner’s history of disinformation via the Internet Research Agency (IRA) and AFRIC, which used troll farms in Ghana and Nigeria to manipulate narratives.
Local influencers and civil society actors also contribute. In Burkina Faso, pro-junta youth groups such as the Mouvement Patriotique pour la Sauvegarde et la Restauration (MPSR) rally public support, organising protests against ECOWAS and France while bolstering Traore’s image. In Niger, intellectuals and activists, such as those behind the M62 movement, frame the junta as a bulwark against neocolonialism. These grassroots actors authenticate the campaign, bridging state propaganda with public sentiment.
Coordinated Chaos – from X, YouTube, Bots to Encrypted Channels
African Stream is one such actor that maintained a broad multi-platform presence, aligning with AES propaganda. Going by the handle African Stream (@african_stream) on X, africa.stream on Instagram, Africanstreammedia on TikTok and Telegram, the Nairobi-based platform is believed to be a front for Russian disinformation, secretly run by Russia’s RT.
With approximately 80,000 followers and 12,000 tweets on X, African Stream has maintained high engagement with content that often aligns with pan-African, anti-Western, and pro-sovereignty narratives, with sharp commentary on Western policies and neocolonialism.
Although YouTube and Meta banned African Stream and the Russian state media outlet RT in September 2024 following the allegations, African Stream denies any wrongdoing and claims to be an independent platform presenting content from an authentic African perspective. However, researchers at the Stanford Internet Observatory note that African Stream shares characteristics with past covert Russian social media influence operations, such as frequently reposting content from other sources, promoting narratives about Africa and the U.S.
On June 22, African Stream announced it was shutting down and would cease posting on July 1 2025, due to the demonetisation of its social media accounts, which made its financial sustainability impossible. In a series of emotionally charged farewell posts on 1 July 2025, African Stream signed off with the same firebrand defiance that had defined its digital presence, blending populist critique and revolutionary fervour into a potent final salvo here and here among a range of posts.
However, it remains to be seen if African Stream will manifest through digital allies like Authentic African. Throughout last year, both platforms collaborated on monthly live streams, alongside various other messages of solidarity and subtle alignment from Authentic African CEO Joe Hotagua, as documented here and here.
Meanwhile, a dataset obtained with Meltwater from June 8, 2025, to July 7, 2025, contains various X posts that include hashtags related to the AES ideology, such as #AES and #AllianceofSahelStates.
Another set of hashtags, #endwesternimperialism and #DownWithECOWAS, obtained from August 5, 2024, to July 5, 2025, reveals a narrative that criticises Western influence and promotes regional military and political independence in one month.
An analysis of the most prolific actors in the dataset reveals a clustered network of accounts that consistently promote pro-AES narratives, often amplifying military successes and anti-Western sentiments.
Numerous instances of copy-and-paste content are shared by different accounts across analysed datasets, indicating clear patterns of coordinated amplification. The post starting with “RT @afrilivesmatter: This is real anti-imperialist solidarity on U.S. soil…” was shared by 753 unique accounts, making it the most widely duplicated message in the combined dataset, while posts like “I love Captain #IbrahimTraoré…” have over 400 duplications.
Similarly, accounts like Sahel Revolutionary Soldier (@cecild84) serve as a platform for rallying support around African sovereignty, criticising Western and ECOWAS interference. Also, X account Active Revolt (@afrilivesmatter) continually frames Western influence as inherently violent and exploitative. At the same time, Sissoko Sora Demba, also known as @DelphineSankara reinforces anti-Western, pro-military, and pro-AES (Alliance of Sahel States) narratives, often through historical grievances and contemporary political critiques.
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However, of all the accounts in the network, the most notable recurring in the obtained dataset is ???????????????????????????????????? ????’???????????????????????????? (@silboyofficiell), described by Google’s Gemini as an X account that appears to be focused on African history, politics, and current events, with a strong emphasis on pan-Africanism and resistance to Western influence. The account frequently features content related to Burkina Faso’s President Ibrahim Traoré, China’s support for African nations, and the unity of the African and Black diaspora. However, a combined Google and advanced X search revealed that the account has now changed its identity, rebranding from ???????????????????????????????????? ????’???????????????????????????? (@silboyofficiell) to AES Alerte (@Aesalerte) across multiple platforms, including X, Instagram, Threads, Facebook, YouTube, and Telegram.
A page transparency review of its Facebook account corroborates this finding. The account was created on August 17, 2023, as ???????????????????????????????? ????’???????????????????????????? by May 3, 2024, it changed its name by adding an “s” after the first name, thereby becoming ???????????????????????????????????? ????’????????????????????????????. On June 19, 2025, the account changed its name to AES Alerte.
Further content analysis of this platform revealed that it had continued its AES-aligned propaganda from its former identity to its current rebranded one. For instance, a content analysis of videos from the channel’s YouTube data reveals a series of videos that closely align with AES’s ideological and propaganda narratives, especially in their titles and descriptions. One prominent example is the video titled “Discours du Général Goïta: 20 Janvier, Hommage aux Forces Armées”, which appears to glorify the leader of Mali’s junta, Colonel Assimi Goïta, and frames military-led governance as a source of national pride and resistance. The date, January 20, is historically symbolic in Mali as a marker of the country’s anti-colonial stance, known as Army Day, further reinforcing the pro-military, anti-Western narrative.
Another video titled “Sahel: Une nouvelle ère d’alliances stratégiques se dessine” directly pushes the core messaging of AES propaganda by suggesting a reconfiguration of power and allegiance in the Sahel region, away from Western influence and toward alternative partnerships, likely with countries such as Russia, China, or within the AES bloc itself. This theme taps into the broader narrative of self-determination and regional sovereignty, key pillars in AES’s media rhetoric.
Videos like “John Mahama au Mali: une visite stratégique?” subtly frame the presence of former Ghanaian president John Mahama in Mali as possibly legitimising the AES agenda. It raises the question of pan-African solidarity extending beyond the Sahel’s borders, suggesting a ripple effect or ideological sympathy across the continent.
AES Alerte’s Telegram channel, which has over 28,000 subscribers, 2,309 videos, and 6,518 photos as of this report, is a bastion of media package distribution for AES-aligned propaganda.
The war of words and images has become a central front in the confrontation that the three Sahelian nations claim to be fighting against perceived neocolonial powers. While critics accuse the ruling juntas of engaging in Coué-style propaganda—such as advising against reporting terrorist attacks to avoid encouraging the perpetrators—the juntas fire back, denouncing what they call relentless attacks by “media liars” advancing an imperialist agenda.
A Coordinated Digital Front
The campaign’s multifaceted behaviours blend traditional propaganda with modern information warfare. AES leaders deliver fiery speeches at public rallies, summits, and state media broadcasts, denouncing ECOWAS as a Western puppet and praising military governance. For instance, at the July 2024 Niamey summit, Tchiani declared the AES an “alliance of the peoples” against ECOWAS’s “foreign-dictated directives.” Traoré has mobilised citizen militias, framing them as patriotic defenders against Western-backed insurgents.
The AES also employs symbolic acts to reinforce its narrative. In September 2024, the bloc introduced a joint biometric passport to replace the ECOWAS passport, symbolising unity and independence from the West African bloc. Mali’s 2025 withdrawal from the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) and the downgrading of French as an official language signal a rejection of colonial legacies. These actions are heavily publicised, generating viral content that resonates with anti-Western and pro-military sentiment.
X narratives glorifying juntas are heavily driven by retweet patterns and media attachment strategies, rather than original content creation. Many pro-AES messages are quote tweets of international coverage such as France24 or BBC Afrique, recontextualised to either dismiss Western media narratives or to frame them as evidence of Western hypocrisy or failure. A recurring behaviour is media reinforcement—images and videos showing AES military exercises, anti-French protests, or rallies in Niamey and Bamako. These visuals are deployed to inspire support and legitimise the AES as a powerful, autonomous bloc.
Another behaviour includes strategic hashtagging. Tweets frequently include combinations of: #AES, #AllianceOfSahelStates, #endwesternimperialism #Niamey, #BurkinaFaso, #SahelBekan, and #antiCFA. These tags signal alignment and extend reach across algorithmic feeds.
The Weaponisation of Narratives
On July 17, 2024, X account Patrick Rules (@rulelikepatrick) which describes itself as an, “Independent geopolitical commentator. UNAPOLOGETICALLY exposing and resisting all corrupt puppets whose greed for power threatens Africa’s UNITY and PROSPERITY!” posted a snippet of his podcast rulesvoice where himself and his female co-host were heartily bashing other West African leaders particularly Ghana for taking the credit for what the three “triumphant West African countries (Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso) are doing”. “Just because they are in the bracket,” his co-host interjected as they both declared other West African countries “still corrupt,” while calling Senegalese President Bassirou Faye the newly appointed Western puppet.
AES-aligned campaign content, like this, is carefully curated to evoke pride, anger, and defiance. In between the narrative, ECOWAS is portrayed as corrupt, elitist, and complicit in undermining African sovereignty. Narratives often refer to it as “the West’s enforcement arm,” accusing it of betraying its people through sanctions and intervention threats.
France, the United States, and the European Union are targeted as modern colonisers using NGOs, embassies, and “liberal democracy” to maintain control over African resources. Leaked documents circulate alleging CIA or DGSE plots against AES leaders.
Coups are reframed as “popular uprisings” or “corrective movements.” Military leaders are cast as protectors of national pride and religious identity, often compared to historical figures like Thomas Sankara or Gamal Abdel Nasser. For example, a viral video of Traoré enrolling for an AES passport in January 2025 was captioned, “A leader who walks with his people.” Military victories, such as Mali’s recapture of Kidal in 2023, are exaggerated to bolster junta legitimacy.
This content is delivered through diverse channels: state TV and radio, X posts, Telegram channels, YouTube, and public rallies.
On X, accounts like Patrick Rules (@rulelikepatrick) position themselves not merely as an information source but as part of a resistance movement. The bio sets the stage: “…UNAPOLOGETICALLY exposing and resisting all corrupt puppets…”
This aligns with several AES information campaigns that depict international institutions as neocolonial relics, while celebrating military-led sovereignty efforts in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
Patric Rules functions like a digital megaphone for AES-aligned ideologies. It blends a youth-friendly content strategy—short videos, strong captions, assertive tones—with hardline political messaging.
The X data from Sissoko Sora Demba also reinforces anti-Western, pro-military, and pro-AES narratives, often through historical grievances and contemporary political critiques. The pinned post references French colonial violence in Mali (“le jour où les Français ont utilisé l’arme lourde à #Ségou”), framing Western powers as historically oppressive, a recurring theme in AES propaganda. The account engages with replies that mock Western influence in Africa, “sous-préfet occidentaux en Afrique (Western sub-prefects in Africa)” and celebrates the AES as a counterforce “, L AES la force tranquille! (AES, the quiet strength!)”. The engagement metrics, e.g., “78K” views on the pinned post, suggest effective dissemination of these ideas within target audiences.
Interestingly, many of the tweets by these accounts cite or retweet a core few sources, such as Sephora Kouame (@SephoraKouame2), L’ACCENT (@Laccent_), and AfricA3000.O4G (@ohabata), indicating a hub-and-spoke style network, where a central set of handles generate original ideological content, and a broader ring of low-engagement accounts disseminates it repeatedly. The result is an echo chamber effect where AES, and by extension, military-led sovereignty narratives, appear more widely accepted and celebrated than they may be. This network architecture is a hallmark of influence operations designed to legitimise alternative political realities, making these accounts critical nodes in the pro-AES propaganda matrix.
A Regional and Global Echo Chamber
The AES campaign reach is staggering, with state media dominating. ORTM reaches 80% of Malian households, RTB 70% in Burkina Faso. Social media penetration is lower—25% in Niger, 35% in Mali—but Telegram and X are urban youth hubs, amplifying AES content.
Regionally, the campaign resonates in Senegal, Guinea, and Chad, where anti-French sentiment has simmered. Guinea’s junta leader, Mamady Doumbouya, endorsed the AES in 2024, hinting at future alignment. Senegal’s President Bassirou Diomaye Faye, elected in 2024, echoed AES rhetoric, questioning French military bases.
Globally, Russian and Chinese media extend the campaign’s footprint. RT’s French-language content, viewed by eight million monthly in Africa, hails the AES as a sovereigntist model. CGTN’s reports on Chinese-funded AES projects, like Mali’s solar plants, counter Western narratives. Bot networks amplify this, with Russian-linked accounts generating 1.5 million views for anti-Western videos in 2024.
Across the 14,156 X posts analysed, the AES-aligned campaign shows a structured and coordinated presence. There were 9,719 reposts and 49,047 views across the top 15 accounts alone, totalling 2,114,079. Meanwhile, metadata from AES-themed videos on the 35 AES Alerte YouTube channel indicates 1,583,293 views, with an average view count of 45,237 per video.
Cumulatively, the AES-aligned media ecosystem has generated a minimum of 3,697,372 confirmed exposures and at least 4 million measurable impressions in the analysed dataset. This does not account for further second-order amplification—such as reposts, quotes, off-platform messaging on Telegram, or news re-circulation—which likely pushes the total influence well above six to eight million digital exposures.
The sentiment distribution showed approximately 55% neutral, 23% positive, and 21% negative sentiments. However, positivity was primarily directed toward military regimes and AES leaders, such as Assimi Goïta, while negativity overwhelmingly targeted France, ECOWAS, and occasionally the United States. The hashtags with the highest frequency included #AES, #EndWesternImperialism, #AllianceOfSahelStates, and #Niamey. These tags linked ideological messages to geographic locations and historical memory, effectively binding online identity to offline geopolitical sentiment.
This reflects a powerful regional information campaign that shapes public perception, reinforces political legitimacy, and isolates dissent against the AES bloc.
A Digital Cold War in the Sahel
The AES shadow game of narratives appears to be a well-orchestrated effort to realign West Africa’s ideological and geopolitical compass, a coordinated network of actors, carefully crafted content, and emotionally resonant narratives.
The cumulative effect is the creation of a digital consensus: the illusion that AES is the people’s choice, and that opposition—especially ECOWAS—is illegitimate or colonial. The shared content reframes the AES as a military alliance and a pan-African liberation front.
As military regimes in the Sahel consolidate power through force, they are increasingly turning to such campaigns to extend their influence, reshape public perception, and destabilise democratic ideals across borders. Experts warn that these coordinated digital campaigns—rooted in disinformation, nationalism, and anti-Western sentiment—pose an existential threat to democracy in the region.
“These campaigns pose a serious threat to democracy in West Africa,” said Mark Duerksen, Strategic Communications Manager and Research Associate at the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies.
“Military regimes and their allies in the Sahel—having seized and held onto power through unconstitutional means—are not only dominating their own information environments through censorship, repression, and propaganda, but are now seeking to export these tactics beyond their borders.”
Duerksen, who monitors security and digital governance trends across the continent, describes a growing trend of authoritarian digital playbooks being exported from military-led countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. These regimes, under the umbrella of the AES, have leveraged propaganda, censorship, and foreign amplification to not only control domestic discourse but also manipulate sentiment in neighbouring democracies.
“By injecting false and misleading narratives into the online ecosystems of neighbouring countries through manipulative means, they aim to shift public discourse, deflect from their failures, and destabilise democratic norms across the region,” he explained.
At the heart of this information strategy is a potent mixture of fear, grievance, and pride. The military juntas amplify populist, anti-colonial messages—often referencing historical icons like Thomas Sankara—to present themselves as legitimate alternatives to failed civilian governance. However, beneath the revolutionary rhetoric lies a darker goal: to erode trust in electoral institutions, demonise pro-democracy actors, and normalise authoritarian takeovers as “corrective” governance.
Mark emphasised the long-term risks, particularly for younger digital audiences. “These campaigns can, over time, shape public perception—especially among young, online audiences—by glorifying military rulers, downplaying their failures, and undermining democratic actors through disinformation. This softens the ground for future coups and delegitimises democratic processes.” The most alarming outcome, he warns, is not only regime survival but contagion—the normalisation of juntas as viable alternatives across a fragile region already reeling from insecurity and disillusionment.
In contrast, Baboloki Semela, a seasoned African Union diplomat and advocate of Pan-Africanism, argues for a nuanced view. While he acknowledges the real dangers of digital misinformation, he cautions against dismissing all anti-Western sentiment as manufactured. Baboloki states,
“These narratives are often amplified by misinformation campaigns or external interests seeking to exploit existing grievances.”
The growing appeal of the AES bloc lies in its ability to tap into legitimate frustration. “What worries me most is that these narratives tend to conflate legitimate African calls for sovereignty, self-reliance, or post-colonial redress with an adversarial stance toward the West,” he said. “The reality is far more nuanced. African nations seek partnerships based on mutual respect, equity, and shared development, not confrontation.
“But when democracy fails to deliver visible dividends, especially in regions plagued by unemployment, corruption, and insecurity, the line between anti-imperialist sentiment and pro-military propaganda begins to blur. “These narratives often prey on citizens’ frustrations… painting democracy as a Western export rather than a governance system that can be rooted in African values of consensus, community, and accountability,” Baboloki noted.
Indeed, the AES digital ecosystem has capitalised on this discontent, framing coups not as constitutional aberrations but as patriotic interventions. In environments where media literacy remains low, particularly in rural areas and among disenfranchised youth, such messaging gains traction rapidly.
To push back, both experts agree on the urgency of proactive engagement. “The antidote lies in building resilience within national information ecosystems,” said Duerksen. That includes robust fact-checking, digital literacy, pre-bunking techniques, and local civil society watchdogs who can decode and expose these narratives. “Local influencers, media, and citizens must collectively push back against foreign-sponsored manipulation and ensure that online discourse reflects authentic voices, not covert operations,” he added.
Baboloki agrees with the sentiment but calls for a broader ideological reawakening led by African institutions to shape the continent’s digital and ideological spaces. “This means investing in strategic communication, digital literacy, and Pan-African civic education to reaffirm that democracy, when inclusive, transparent, and locally owned, remains the best path for sustainable peace and development across Africa.”
The stakes are clear. In the digital age, legitimacy is not only secured through ballots or barracks—it is coded into the narratives people share, believe, and act upon. In West Africa, where the line between democracy and dictatorship now runs through timelines and hashtags, defending democratic ideals requires political will and narrative power.
As ECOWAS and its partners grapple with how to respond, it is clear that deterrence alone will not suffice. This is a war of ideas and narratives fought in the digital trenches. Countering it will require fact-checking, media literacy campaigns, and a renewed commitment to good governance, transparency, and regional solidarity.
For now, the AES alliance holds the momentum, not just on the battlefield but in the minds of millions, and that may just be the most powerful territory of all, especially in such an era of disinformation.
