Nigeria’s Security: Between Self-Defence and Community Policing
By Mukhtar Ya’u Madobi
As Nigeria continues to battle worsening security challenges—ranging from banditry and kidnapping to terrorism, insurgency, and communal violence—citizens across the country are increasingly embracing grassroots security measures and calls for self-defence.
These challenges are not confined to the North. In the South, militancy, piracy, secessionist agitations, cultism, and cybercrimes further complicate the nation’s fragile security landscape.
Speaking at the maiden annual lecture of the National Association of the Institute for Security Studies, themed “Mobilising Stakeholders to Curb Insecurity in Nigeria: A Practical Approach,” the Director-General of the Department of State Services (DSS), Oluwatosin Ajayi, stressed the need for communities to take greater responsibility for their own security. He cited examples where local populations had historically repelled insurgents and urged communities to work closely with security agencies to counter threats such as terrorism, banditry, and kidnapping.
Ajayi noted that it is unrealistic to expect security agencies to protect every citizen across Nigeria’s expansive territory. He argued that communities must serve as the first line of defence, and that empowering them would enhance grassroots resilience while reducing overreliance on federal forces.
Echoing this position, former Chief of Defence Staff, General TY Danjuma (rtd), recently renewed his longstanding call for Nigerians to rise in self-defence against non-state actors. Reacting to fresh waves of violence in Plateau, Benue, and other states, Danjuma insisted that citizens can no longer afford to remain passive while bandits and terrorists wreak havoc.
“The warning I gave years ago remains valid. Nigerians must rise and defend themselves. The government alone cannot protect us,” he said.
This message of self-defence has increasingly resonated across vulnerable communities, reflecting the harsh reality of an overstretched security system that leaves millions exposed. The roots of the crisis lie in decades of state neglect, porous borders, weak intelligence systems, and economic exclusion.
In the North-West, states such as Zamfara, Katsina, and Kaduna are under siege by bandits who raid villages, rustle livestock, extort ransoms, and impose levies. In the North-Central region, particularly Plateau and Benue, farmer-herder conflicts have morphed into sustained ethno-religious violence. The South-East contends with secessionist violence linked to IPOB/ESN elements, who often target security infrastructure. Meanwhile, the South-West and South-South struggle with cultism, ritual killings, and piracy.
One chilling episode was the abduction of more than 280 schoolchildren in Kuriga, Kaduna State, in March 2024. Although the children were eventually rescued, the incident laid bare the glaring weaknesses in Nigeria’s security infrastructure and left the community traumatized.
Faced with these realities, several states have begun taking their destinies into their own hands. In April 2025, the Kano State Government passed the Security Neighborhood Watch Law to create a legal framework for community-led security efforts. Katsina has trained local vigilantes through its Community Watch Corps, while in Zamfara, Governor Dauda Lawal launched the Community Protection Guards (CPG), a controversial but welcomed initiative in rural areas long neglected by formal forces.
In the North-East, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) continues to support military efforts against Boko Haram, leveraging local knowledge and swift response capabilities. The Amotekun Corps in the South-West, headquartered in Ondo State, has addressed critical security gaps in the region, earning both criticism and praise. Similarly, the South-East’s Ebube Agu and joint regional outfits in the South-South emerged from the growing public distrust in the federal government’s ability to guarantee safety.
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However, the growing wave of self-defence and vigilante initiatives raises ethical, legal, and practical concerns. Nigeria’s Firearms Act prohibits civilians from bearing arms without a licence. Without a clear regulatory framework, arming civilians risks escalating violence, enabling political thuggery, and creating new security threats under the guise of protection.
These dangers are not hypothetical. In Edo State’s Uromi community, vigilantes wrongfully accused 16 Northern hunters of being kidnappers and burned them alive. In July 2022, Ebube Agu operatives reportedly killed 14 unarmed wedding guests in Otulu, Imo State. Other vigilante groups in the region have been implicated in extrajudicial killings and abuses. A Daily Trust investigation in April 2025 revealed that vigilante groups killed at least 68 people in three months, with many more subjected to torture, harassment, or unlawful detention.
These developments have prompted the House of Representatives Committee on Army to call for regulation, oversight, and training of vigilante groups. The Uromi killings, in particular, triggered national outrage and renewed demands for accountability.
Responding to these concerns, Maj. Gen. Chris Olukolade (rtd), Chairman of the Centre for Crisis Communication, acknowledged General Danjuma’s fears but cautioned against unregulated civilian self-defence. He warned that unless communities are engaged within a structured and legal framework, insecurity may only worsen. According to him, civilians should not be armed unless integrated into formal security systems with clear guidelines.
Against this backdrop, community policing has emerged as a more sustainable and coordinated alternative. Under the leadership of the Inspector General of Police, pilot schemes have been launched across several states. These involve recruiting and training locals for surveillance, intelligence gathering, and early intervention, followed by their integration into existing police structures.
Lagos, Ekiti, and Kano States have all recorded notable progress. In Kano, the Hisbah Corps, initially tasked with moral enforcement, has been reoriented to contribute to broader urban security. In Lagos, the Neighbourhood Safety Corps plays a vital role in gathering intelligence and issuing early warnings.
Nonetheless, community policing faces serious limitations. Funding shortfalls, inter-agency rivalries, and a lack of coordination continue to undermine its effectiveness. A major stumbling block is the constitutional contradiction where state governors are designated as Chief Security Officers but lack control over federal police operations within their jurisdictions.
Solving Nigeria’s security crisis requires a comprehensive strategy that addresses institutional, legal, and socio-economic issues. First, the constitution must be amended to empower state and community policing structures with defined jurisdictions and robust oversight. Second, vigilante and self-defence groups must be trained, regulated, and integrated into the formal security architecture to avoid becoming a threat themselves. Third, intelligence gathering should begin at the grassroots, where community members are often the first to notice early warning signs. Fourth, addressing the root causes of insecurity—such as unemployment, poverty, and youth disenfranchisement—through investments in education, job creation, and social empowerment is essential. Lastly, traditional and religious leaders must be given formal roles in mediation, peacebuilding, and community-based conflict resolution, given their influence and trust within local populations.
Nigeria’s security challenges demand more than rhetoric and reactive responses. While the instinct to defend oneself is natural in the face of government failure, unregulated self-defence is a risky and unsustainable path. The lasting solution lies in creating a decentralized, community-driven security model rooted in legality, ethics, and shared responsibility.
As communities across the country face mounting threats, the question is no longer whether to adopt localized security strategies—but how best to coordinate, empower, and regulate them before chaos becomes the norm.
Mukhtar Ya’u Madobi is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Crisis Communication. He can be reached via [email protected].
