Rebranding Royalty: Saudi Arabia’s Response to Iran’s Fall By Baba El-Yakubu
When I arrived in the Saudi Arabian capital to start work at King Saud University in 1996, I met a very nice and congenial Sudanese gentleman. He offered me three unsolicited pieces of advice—one of which was to avoid discussing religious matters, especially the thorny issue of Sunni-Shia ideological debates. During my ten-year stay in Riyadh, I lived by that maxim. Since the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 and its calls for the overthrow of monarchies and secular governments, Saudi regimes have been looking for ways to contain it. Therefore, I was not surprised when leaked U.S. diplomatic cables revealed that, in April 2008, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia urged the United States to attack Iran and destroy its nuclear facilities. Almost two decades later, the breaking news on June 22, about a United States-led attack on Iranian nuclear sites may cause the Saudi princes—and many others—to rejoice.
It is true that the attack has shaken the geopolitical foundations of the Middle East and is a strategic blow to Iran’s ambitions and, by extension, a potential turning point in Saudi Arabia’s long-standing rivalry with Tehran. But the deeper truth is more complex. Far from cementing Saudi Arabia’s uncontested leadership in the region or the broader Muslim world or the absence of threat to monarchies, Iran’s weakening could open a Pandora’s box of challenges for the Kingdom. The ghosts of past empires, shifting alliances, and the ever-volatile politics of religion and power suggest that the end of Iran’s regional dominance will not be Saudi Arabia’s beginning—it may instead mark the onset of a new phase of vulnerability and reckoning. Saudi Arabia and Iran have engaged in a decades-long cold war marked by proxy battles, ideological competition, and regional influence—from Syria to Yemen, from Lebanon to Iraq and to a lesser extent in Nigeria. When Nigerian Army attacked members of Shia group – the Islamic Movement in Nigeria – on Saturday, 12 December 2015, accusing fingers were pointed at Saudi Arabia. While the weakening of Iran through military means may appear to favor Saudi ambitions, history warns us that the fall of a common adversary does not always lead to peace or supremacy. Rather, it often unearths new rivals, new resistance, and new questions of legitimacy.
Consider the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The toppling of Saddam Hussein was celebrated by some Gulf monarchies at the time, but in reality, it created a power vacuum that ultimately empowered Iran more than anyone else. Shia militias, nurtured by Tehran, came to dominate post-war Iraq. What initially looked like a victory turned into a long-term strategic miscalculation. By 2010, the Arab Spring shook the political foundations of the Middle East. It was triggered by a bold protest by a single individual, which sparked a wave of pro-democracy uprisings that ultimately toppled several leaders.
Similarly, if Iran is significantly weakened today, it may leave no vacuum—only an explosion of sympathy and resistance from communities and states that view the attack as unjust or Western-engineered. Anti-American and anti-Saudi sentiments may surge in countries like Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Syria, parts of Pakistan and northern Nigeria, where Iran has historical influence and ideological followers. The perpetual schism between Arabian Princes and Arab Streets may be a serious fault line for new crises.
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At the heart of Saudi Arabia’s emerging vulnerability is its evolving relationship with Israel and the United States. Though relations with both countries have warmed in recent years—particularly through quiet security cooperation with Israel and military partnerships with Washington—this proximity could backfire based on both Isreal wider ambition and in the eyes of the Muslim world. Clearly, Israel will not rest on its oars. It has a broader long-term security ambition. Israel seems to be borrowing from the playbook of the “Bush Doctrine.” It was during the presidency of George W. Bush that U.S. security policy departed from the well-established international order of tit-for-tat—that is, countries only respond to actual attacks. Instead, Bush expanded this order to include preemptive action against potential threats before they materialize.
The current crisis in the Middle East suggests that Israel’s national security doctrine is to simply ‘nip threats in the bud.’ But who decides whether the bud will grow into a fragrant, beautiful flower or a poisonous fruit? As Brett McGurk, a CNN global affairs analyst, pointed out in a recent article: “The corollary to this doctrine is that once Israel gains an advantage over an adversary, it will not easily relinquish that advantage.” A corollary to this corollary is that with the decline of Iran and the rise of Israel as the dominant power in the region, Israel will be reluctant to cede its dominance in both security and economic influence. This implies that Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region must either accept being client states of Israel or remain within its sphere of influence.
Already, Saudi Arabia’s de facto alignment with Israel, especially against Iran and through support for the Abraham Accords, has triggered concerns across the Muslim world, particularly among the Palestinians and wider Arab populations who still see Israel through the lens of occupation and apartheid. If Iran, a state that has consistently positioned itself as the champion of Palestine, is crushed with Saudi Arabia standing by – or even indirectly benefiting – it may undermine Saudi Arabia’s credibility in the Muslim world.
The 1979 Iranian Revolution, for all its excesses, gained sympathy across many Muslim populations not because of its Shia ideology, but because it defied American imperialism and stood up to Israel. Saudi Arabia risks becoming the “imperial favorite” – a label that may alienate it from the grassroots Muslim sentiment in Africa, Asia, and even among some Arabs. During the 12-Day Isreal-Iran war, in an unexpected turn, Sheikh Aminu Daurawa – a Sunni cleric and the head of Kano State’s religious police – called for prayers in support of Iran. This clearly shows that Islamic world is not monolithic. While some Sunni regimes may welcome the demise of Iran’s influence, others may resist Saudi hegemony, especially if it comes tied to American or Israeli military interventions. Countries like Turkey, Qatar, and Malaysia—which have often walked their own foreign policy paths—may rally around Iran’s narrative of resistance and accuse Saudi Arabia of abandoning the cause of Muslim unity. It was a similar dynamic in the late 1970s and early 1980s – after the Iranian Revolution – that sparked interest among some members of the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria (MSSN) in Islamic revivalism. This led to the formation of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) by former MSSN leaders. Domestically, the Kingdom is in a delicate place. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 reforms have modernized aspects of Saudi society but have also alienated conservatives. A weakened Iran may embolden the Kingdom externally, but any perception of overreach or betrayal of Islamic values could stir unrest at home.
King Abdullah once described Iran as a snake whose head must be cut off. Based on the current dynamics in the region, he may be rejoicing in his grave. But as history has shown time and again, when an empire falls, it does not always lead to peace for its rivals. It leads to fragmentation, rebellion, and unintended consequences. Saudi Arabia may indeed emerge from Iran’s fall as the region’s most powerful state on paper. But power is not the same as leadership, and dominance is not the same as legitimacy. The Kingdom must now rebrand itself as a neutral arbiter and reckon with the delicate art of balancing power with humility. It must avoid being perceived as a favorite of some imperial power.
Baba El-Yakubu is a Professor of Chemical Engineering at Ahmadu Bello University.
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